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operations and battles are graphic and
bring a reality not seen very often.
A longtime resident of southern Africa,
Emerson is a renowned scholar of
African affairs, having served as Chair
of Security Studies at the U.S. National
Defense University’s Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, and as head of the
Africa regional studies program at the
U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge
and experience make The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle,
1977–1992 a must-read for anyone
seeking to understand the history and
challenges of the African continent.
ROGER H. DUCEY

Epstein, Katherine. Torpedo: Inventing the
Military-Industrial Complex in the United States
and Great Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 2014. 328pp. $45

Kate Epstein’s book about the relationships between the torpedo and the
creation of the military-industrial
complex builds on her earlier work
about naval tactics, in particular her essay in the April 2013 Journal of Military
History about “torpedoes and U.S. Navy
battle tactics” before World War I. (See
Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can
Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’:
Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History
before World War I,” Journal of Military History 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp.
491–520.) Here she goes after much
bigger “fish”—excuse the pun. Epstein
wastes no time in getting to her primary
thesis in this fascinating monograph
about the development of the torpedo
as a weapon system in the United States
and Great Britain. She begins boldly:
“Thus, in addition to the part they
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played in the origins of the militaryindustrial complex, torpedoes were at
the nexus of the international arms race,
globalization, and industrialization after
World War I.” Epstein takes the reader
on a journey back in time to relate a
story little told and even less known.
The modern self-propelled torpedo,
invented and improved in the last half of
the nineteenth century by the Englishman Robert Whitehead, was naval
warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon.
Like breech-loading rifles and artillery,
also products of the nineteenth century,
it changed the landscape of war in its
environment—the maritime domain.
Just as breech-loading rifles increased
the lethality and scope of land warfare,
so too did the torpedo, but on unimaginable scales in a very short time
period. As Epstein notes in her introduction, “Over a fifty-year period the speed
of torpedoes had increased by roughly
800 percent, and their range by 5,000
percent. They were the cutting edge of
technology.” When combined with other
so-called disruptive technologies, like
the airplane and the submarine—that is,
technologies so unique that they break
sociopolitical, commercial, and military
paradigms—they had the potential to
and, in fact, did throw existing notions
of sea power, naval tactics, and even
maritime strategy into question. It was
no accident that the great maritime
strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian
Corbett—emerged during the period
of the torpedo’s rise to prominence
as sailors recast their thinking about
naval tactics in the modern age in part
because of cutting-edge technology.
Epstein builds on the work of historian
William McNeill and his arguments
about the emergence of “command
technology” in the nineteenth century,
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which she defines as “technology commanded by the public sector from the
private sector that was so sophisticated
and expensive that neither possessed
the resources to develop it alone.”
Because the public sector could not
deliver expensive new technology on its
own, it “had to invest in [research and
development] by the private sector.” Her
larger argument about the emergence
of military-industrial complexes in the
United States and Britain hinges on this
relationship, and torpedoes represented
what one might call an agency technology, providing a forcing function for
public and private sectors to overcome
the difficulties in solving complex
military problems—problems that could
only be solved in partnership. Throughout the book Epstein emphasizes, constantly, the contingent nature of these
developing relationships—that the actors
did not conform to some script. They
simply wanted to solve difficult, complex
problems, and their decisions shaped
how the military-industrial complexes
and both countries developed as a result.

technological ideas—the British came
out ahead in developing better torpedoes
in the long run. It also seems counterintuitive that the British would do better
than the weaker Americans in developing a weapon that threatened Britain’s
naval hegemony, but that is precisely
what happened. The British did better
in developing the “weapon of the weak”
than the relatively weak Americans, who
would have seemed to have had more interest in such weapons. The British went
further, realizing savings in the long
run as they envisioned a future without
battleships, using flotillas of torpedo
craft and battle cruisers to protect their
interests. This future essentially came to
fruition during and after World War II
as the new battle cruiser—designed to
patrol the global commons and protect
British maritime interests—evolved
into the aircraft carrier. As for torpedo
flotillas, what emerged during the Cold
War were submarine and antisubmarine fleets of very large size both to
dispute and to protect those same sea
lines should all-out war break out.

In her closing Epstein makes conclusions that get to the heart of today’s
discussions about American decline,
technological challenges, and innovation
and that may seem counterintuitive
—especially in light of the challenge of
China and antiaccess and area denial
(A2/AD) strategies. These may be of
some comfort to the pessimists out there
who claim America is in an irreversible decline. The British had a larger
research and development infrastructure in both public and private sectors
precisely because they were the naval
hegemon of that era. Even though many
of their decisions vis-à-vis technology
seemed more cautious than those made
by American naval officers—who were
somewhat credulous in embracing new

The one critique this reviewer has of the
book involves the impact of the RussoJapanese War on torpedo development
during the period covered by this book.
Japan’s opening torpedo attack on the
Russian fleet in 1904 at Port Arthur
was not exactly a “coming-out party”
for the weapon system: 85 percent of
the Japanese torpedoes missed their
targets. Perhaps the Americans and
British thought they had solved the clear
problems that torpedoes presented in
their design and use, but a mention of
this key episode in the development of
the torpedo—a flop on opening night if
you will—would seem merited. Nonetheless, Epstein’s book goes places and
discovers truths that few other books
on naval history have. Although it is not
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an easy read, the arguments it makes
are of vital interest to naval strategists,
innovators, and those interested in
the complex relationships and processes that are now part and parcel
of the national defense paradigm.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Friedman, B. A., ed. 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern
Era. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
150pp. $21

21st Century Ellis is a solid contribution to the Naval Institute’s 21st Century
Foundations series and the scholarship
regarding the touted U.S. Marine Corps
visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete”
Ellis. The strength of this volume lies
in the compilation of most of Ellis’s
scholarly works. B. A. Friedman has
assembled five articles written by Ellis
in the decade between 1911 and 1921
(a total of about 110 pages) into four
chapters. Ellis’s text is supplemented by
Friedman’s introduction and additional
commentary highlighting the value of
Ellis to both his contemporaries and
current executors of the operational art.
Friedman arranges the essays by subject
rather than chronologically. This allows
the reading of the book by section without any loss of flow or context. Chapter
2, the shortest, reviews Ellis’s First World
War experience in France on the staff of
John A. Lejeune. Chapter 3 is substantially longer but unlike the preceding
chapter is perhaps of more applicability
to modern practitioners. Two lectures
prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a
faculty member at the U.S. Naval War
College examined the challenges of
fighting a naval campaign in the western
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Pacific. Composed in 1911–12, these
proved prescient in their assessment of
the tension building between Pacific
naval powers and the war they would
fight after Ellis’s death. There is great
legitimacy to the editor’s claim that “Ellis predicted war with Japan in 1912.”
Chapter 1 may be most relevant to
Marines of this century. Ellis draws
from his substantial experience fighting
counterinsurgency in the Philippines
during the early years of last century. His
seventeen-page article “Bush Brigades”
provides a solid foundation for any
twenty-first-century warrior preparing
for service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The
editor summarizes how Ellis’s tenets
are strongly reflected in the Marine
Corps’s Small Wars Manual as well as
today’s counterinsurgency doctrine,
while lamenting the “ill use of many of
these tenets” in more-modern conflicts.
A current practitioner would benefit
by paying attention to Ellis’s words.
The final chapter built around Ellis’s
work, chapter 4, is the longest and the
major impetus behind Friedman’s effort.
Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines
as the man who laid the template for
modern amphibious operations. Read
in detail, Ellis’s article “Advanced Base
Operations in Micronesia” reinforces
that view. Ellis systematically takes a
reader through the requirements for an
advance across the Pacific to be successful. Many of these tenets informed
Marine Corps development prior to
the U.S. entry into the Second World
War, laying the groundwork for highly
successful amphibious operations in
both the Pacific and European theaters.
While successful in providing a new
generation of military practitioners easy
access to Ellis’s work, 21st Century Ellis
could have more successfully achieved
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